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Playfulness, open-mindedness, thinking ‘outside the box’ describe a desirable and highly regarded 
state that children naturally engage in and most adults desperately crave. Across all aspects of 
modern life, we are constantly bombarded by pervasive powerful messages encouraging us to 
inquire and explore, discover and innovate. This desire is mirrored in public policies, education 
practices and business models, which emphasize the need for curiosity, innovation and creativity 
over the need for knowledge reproduction, imitation, and conformity (Cachia et al. 2010; Dede 
2010; King and Rogers 2014; Trilling and Fadel 2009; OECD 2018; UNESCO International 
Bureau of Education 2014). 
Among several positively valenced psychological terms often used interchangeably, 
curiosity, wonder and creativity hold a special place in the study of human development as core 
mechanisms behind knowledge acquisition and knowledge transformation. As such, curiosity 
drives information seeking, wonder expands and enriches the quest for knowledge to new 
dimensions, and creativity enables transformation of existing knowledge and generation of new, 
original knowledge about the world. These capacities are already present, albeit in rudimentary 
forms, and reliably observable in early childhood. However, the cognitive mechanisms underlying 
the processes of curiosity, wonder and creativity, the links between them, and their developmental 
trajectories are currently poorly understood. 
Scholarly inquiries into curiosity, wonder and creativity abound in the fields of philosophy 
and education (Carlson 2008; Carson 2011; Engel 2015; Schinkel 2017; Starko 2013; Vasalou 
2012, 2015; Verhoeven 1972). However, psychological research into exact links between these 
concepts is inconclusive, owing to vague conceptual definitions, lack of robust measures, and 
disregard of dynamics of developmental change. The goal of the present chapter is to review the 
existing psychological accounts of curiosity, wonder and creativity in early development and 
explore the conceptual links, unifying theoretical approaches and methodological considerations 
from a cognitive developmental perspective. 
Cognitive developmental science aims to uncover the underlying cognitive mechanisms 
enabling psychological phenomena and explain their changes with development. From this 
perspective, methods such as brain scanning (EEG, fNIRS, fMRI), physiological response 
measuring (e.g., heart rate and skin conductance), facial electromyography (EMG), eye-tracking 
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and pupil dilation response measuring, as well as monitoring explicit, reliably observable 
behaviour, may be powerful tools for understanding curiosity, wonder and creativity. The field is 
ripe for applying such methods to help theoretically and conceptually delineate the unique features 
of each of these psychological phenomena, enable development of age-appropriate measures for 
their rigorous experimental study, and investigate the links between them and their co-
development. 
In the present chapter, we review the state of the cognitive developmental research on these 
topics, with a special focus on successful methodological approaches, as well as challenges for the 
experimental study of their cognitive underpinnings. The chapter comprises four main sections: 1) 
Curiosity, where we focus on children’s active exploration, information seeking, and question 
asking; 2) Wonder, where we emphasize affective response, reflection, and pursuit of further 
knowledge; 3) Creativity, where we discuss capacities such as generating ideas, original 
transformations, and novel combinations; and 4) Relationship between curiosity, wonder and 
creativity, where we propose that these links are complex and dynamic; concluding with 




Curiosity is broadly defined as an intrinsically motivated exploration with an information-seeking 
goal (Bazhydai, Twomey, and Westermann, 2020; Kidd and Hayden 2015). Crucially, in a 
curiosity-driven process, information is being sought for its own sake and not as a means of 
obtaining food or another kind of essentially non-epistemic reward. Curiosity is often described in 
terms of two distinct dimensions: perceptual vs. epistemic and specific vs. diversive (Berlyne 
1950). Thus, a range of behaviours can be called curiosity, from momentarily picking up a random 
book from the library book shelf to reading an encyclopaedia chapter, and from locating a particular 
fact about the topic of interest to seeking an escape from boredom by browsing an online news 
website. In the past decades, cognitive scientists, employing a range of approaches from the fields 
of neuroscience, robotics and computational modelling, have started to develop better 
understanding of the cognitive origins of curiosity and its cognitive underpinnings in early 
childhood. 
Several theoretical perspectives have been proposed to explain how curiosity arises. Among 
those are drive, incongruency, information gap and learning progress approaches (see Bazhydai et 
al., 2020, for a detailed review). Behaviourist approaches saw curiosity among other basic drives 
motivated by anticipated reward, similar to food and comfort seeking. Infants’ attention in response 
to new and interesting stimuli was here explained in terms of mere orienting reflexes. While 
identifying the lower level components underlying curiosity-driven behaviour, largely from work 
on animal models, these approaches neglected more complex and cognitively rich mechanisms. In 
the wake of the cognitive revolution in psychological science in the 1950s-60s, curiosity received 
a fresh and more sophisticated look. A newly proposed way to explain the preference for novelty, 
surprise and complexity was to adopt an incongruency detection perspective. This approach 
postulates that upon detecting a mismatch between the existing state of knowledge and incoming 
information, a process of curiosity allows one to update one’s existing knowledge. That is, a person 
is driven to achieve “a feeling of coherence and of necessity, the satisfaction of arriving at a system, 
which is both complete in itself and indefinitely extensible” (Piaget 1969, 139). Relatedly, the 
information gap theory (Loewenstein 1994) proposes that curiosity arises when an individual 
encounters a gap in their knowledge and is then motivated to fill it with new and relevant 
information. Here, curiosity cannot emerge if the level of prior knowledge is too low or too high 
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in relation to the novel information, while an intermediate level of information familiarity and 
complexity is optimal for arousing curiosity (Kinney and Kagan 1976; Kidd, Piantadosi, and Aslin 
2012, 2014). Finally, learning progress theories presume that curiosity’s goal is to maximize 
information acquisition by minimizing uncertainty (Oudeyer, Gottlieb, and Lopes 2016; Twomey 
and Westermann 2018). Here, learning itself is an intrinsically motivating process, which in turn 
fuels a just as intrinsically motivated curiosity process, thus creating a positive, rewarding loop for 
driving knowledge acquisition.  
This variety of theoretical approaches to curiosity has been instrumental in scientists’ 
ability to formulate key questions to better understand how curiosity works. Whereas in Berlyne’s 
classification, information novelty and complexity serve as determinants of curiosity, the 
information gap theory relies on reflective awareness of one’s current knowledge in order to detect 
a gap, and the learning progress approaches place the greatest importance on the emerging, self-
driven optimization of information intake to enable effective learning. Most contemporary 
approaches agree that the existing knowledge state and the ability to obtain new information 
dynamically interact to give rise to curiosity. 
Developmental psychologists often describe curiosity in conjunction with infants’ 
exploratory activities. The image of the busy infant actively exploring its environment, 
approaching, touching, banging, mouthing and throwing toys, putting blocks on top of each other, 
constantly changing its position, crawling around, and engaging its caregivers in a rather 
demanding manner underpins this confluence of curiosity as a cognitive mechanism and curiosity 
as an exploratory behaviour. According to Piaget (1945), such active exploration enables infants 
to construct knowledge of the existing world.1 Infants explore through visual scanning of their 
environment (as detected by eye movements tracking), object manipulation (grasping, throwing 
and mouthing them), preferentially approaching something that captured their interest (e.g., 
crawling towards a new toy), as well as querying others for information with all communicative 
tools available to them (Bazhydai, Westermann, and Parise, 2020; Begus and Southgate, 2018).  
Infants’ motivation to know how something works is sometimes proposed to explain the 
very process of curiosity-driven learning. A widely used metaphor presents young children as “little 
scientists”, keen on discovering the world through optimized and adaptively rational learning 
mechanisms akin to the scientific process of knowledge discovery by trial-and-error. Recent 
research in cognitive developmental psychology highlights sophisticated information seeking 
strategies guiding infants’ exploratory behaviours, such as active generation and testing of 
hypotheses about the world, attempts to understand the causal mechanisms of encountered events, 
and heightened interest in objects that violated their expectations (Bonawitz, van Schijndel, Friel, 
and Schulz 2012; Gopnik, Meltzoff, and Kuhl 1999). For example, infants who saw a surprising 
event, such as an object passing through a solid wall and emerging on the other side intact, looked 
at it longer and crawled toward such an object more often than with an event that was just novel 
(Sim and Xu 2017; Stahl and Feigenson 2017, 2019). These rudimentary behaviours can be 
interpreted at different levels. Either infants are merely interested in something unusual and 
therefore surprising, or, at a higher level, they are interested in resolving the uncertainty caused by 
the unusual event by seeking disambiguating or clarifying information about it. Studies with older 
children provided more context for the latter interpretation. For example, when the evidence 
presented to children was confounded (such as when two different explanations were possible for 
 
1 Furthermore, Piaget (1945) highlighted that it is through ‘playful interactions’ with the environment that the infant 
acquires knowledge, drawing a subtle link between learning what is known and creating something new through play 
– the argument we want to develop further in this paper. 
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what makes the funny noise in an exciting new toy), children explored the toy in a way that would 
allow them to understand the precise causal mechanism (Schulz and Bonawitz 2007). When 
information taught to them was insufficient (i.e., the teacher committed the ‘sin of omission’ by 
not relating all relevant information), primary school children’s exploration was strategic to 
compensate for the missing knowledge (Gweon et al. 2014). 
Curiosity-driven exploration in early childhood is evident in both independent and social 
processes. That is, encountering the need for information (either upon seeing a surprising event or 
when lacking information which they cannot obtain by themselves) may trigger infants’ turning to 
others for help. Social partners are potent sources of information for young children, and the ability 
to interrogate them by asking questions and posing information-seeking requests develops in the 
first years of life (Begus and Southgate 2018; Ronfard et al. 2018; Southgate, Van Maanen, and 
Csibra 2007). Enabling such epistemic curiosity in social learning contexts, infants’ early 
nonverbal communicative skills such as babbling, social referencing and pointing precede verbal 
question asking. Infants use them actively and selectively, paying attention to epistemic cues that 
available social partners exhibit (Harris and Lane 2014; Poulin-Dubouis and Brosseau-Liard 2016). 
They also strategically request pertinent information about the immediate environment from 
someone who can be regarded as knowledgeable about it as opposed to an ignorant person, and do 
so only when information (e.g., an unfamiliar object name or a hidden object location) was being 
asked for but not available to them (Bazhydai et al. 2020; Begus and Southgate 2012; Begus, Gliga, 
and Southgate 2016; Goupil, Romand-Monnier, and Kouider 2016; Kovács et al. 2014; Vaish, 
Demir, and Baldwin 2011). Thus, infants engage in curiosity-driven knowledge acquisition before 
they are even able to speak. 
With development, deliberate question asking gives rise to more precise, sophisticated, and 
complex processes (Choinard 2007; see Ronfard et al. 2018 for a review). To seek knowledge from 
others, disambiguate unclear facts and confront counter-intuitive testimony, children pose ‘why’ 
questions, demand clarifying answers, solicit additional evidence, and question the reliability of 
information, actively engaging in critical thinking processes powered by intrinsic motivation 
(Frazier, Gelman, and Wellman 2009; Tizard and Hughes 1984). However, while social contexts 
may be conducive to the satisfaction of curiosity – if children seek information from social partners 
when in need – sometimes overly normative situations may inhibit curiosity. For example, when 
provided with a counter-intuitive testimony by an otherwise trustworthy adult, preschoolers 
endorsed the adult’s judgment without skepticism or attempts to engage in independent verification 
even when given opportunity to do so (Ronfard, Chen, and Harris 2018; Ronfard et al. 2019). And 
when taught in a directive, explicitly pedagogical manner, children limited their further 
spontaneous exploration as if treating received evidence as exhaustive and normative (Bonawitz et 
al. 2011). 
While actively engaging in strategic information seeking, infants are also known to 
constantly explore seemingly without an immediate perceivable goal. Given this sometimes 
aimless search for information, which is a hallmark of the diversive-perceptual kind of curiosity in 
contrast to the specific-epistemic kind (Berlyne 1950), infants’ attention has been compared to a 
lantern, in comparison to adults’ more focused spotlight (Gopnik 2009). Formalization of infants’ 
behavioural exploration has led to the development of artificial intelligence models in robotics and 
computational modelling (Gottlieb and Oudeyer 2018; Oudeyer 2017). The main idea behind these 
approaches is that infants’ exploration (active information sampling, in jargon terms) is not random 
but rather systematic and selective, thus enabling optimal and efficient learning (Smith et al. 2018). 
“Infants are curious learners who drive their own cognitive development by imposing structure on 
their learning environment as they explore”, in the words of Twomey and Westermann (2018) who 
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developed a neurocomputational model of infants’ exploration as they learn object categories. This 
model, operating on the principle of the in-the-moment, step-wise maximization of learning 
opportunities, emphasized the importance of dynamic interaction between the properties of the 
available information, the environment, and the learner’s current internal state. Given the freedom 
to select an object to learn from at each iterative step of the process, the model chose stimuli that 
took into account these interactions in order to optimize learning. In doing so the model generated 
exploratory sequences of overall intermediate complexity, echoing studies with infants as young 
as 7 months old showing that infants’ visual attention to sequences of events that are either too 
simple (too familiar) or too complex (overly unpredictable and novel) is diminished while attention 
to events of intermediate complexity is enhanced. This preference for intermediate complexity 
(called the “Goldilocks Effect” of curiosity-driven exploration), supports the idea that infants 
implicitly seek information that they can reliably absorb and that is neither too boring nor too 
cognitively taxing (Kidd, Piantadosi, and Aslin 2012). An active and selective role played by a 
child in the learning process via discovery is key to “an increase in intellectual potency” understood 
as strategic deployment of cognitive resources (Bruner 1961). 
The variety of approaches to the study of curiosity feature in turn in the variety of methods 
that may be successfully employed to uncover its mechanisms in early childhood. Viable measures 
include detection of visual and manual exploration, neural signals, physiological responses, and 
explicit behavioural choices. For example, the peak of the pupil dilation measured with eye-
tracking equipment can be used to examine when infants are curious about what they are seeing. 
This measure has been successfully used with adults, correlating with self-reported curiosity (Kang 
et al. 2009), and with infants when they viewed sequences of images that were first scrambled and 
then unscrambled (Ackermann, Hepach, and Mani 2020). The amount of looking (allocation of 
attention) can be captured with fine-grained eye-tracking of infants’ visual exploration of complex 
visual scenes, which has been shown in adults to correlate with their individual curiosity trait 
(Baranes, Oudeyer, and Gottlieb 2015; Risko et al. 2012). Similarly, suspending attention (looking 
away) may be a measure of curiosity’s transience – determined by how rapidly curiosity subsides 
when a curiosity-inducing stimulus is removed. Physiological correlates of curiosity have been 
proposed as a decreased (decelerating) heart rate and increased skin conductance response 
(AlZoubi, D’Mello, and Calvo 2012; Berlyne, and Lewis 1963; Spinks and Siddle 1985), though 
these have to be carefully distinguished from general positive emotional arousal (Langsdorf et al. 
1983; Hutt 1966; Hughes and Hutt 1979; Provost and Gouin-Dicarie 1979) and attention (de 
Barbaro, Clackson, and Wass 2017; Libby, Lacey, and Lacey 1973). Another implicit behaviour – 
facial displays of interest – can be measured in infants by coding their perplexed, puzzled, quizzical 
facial expressions (e.g., eyes widened and mouth slightly open, but with no smile) (Feinman et al. 
1992; Hornik and Gunnar 1988; Reeve and Nix 1997). Finally, studying neural signatures is an 
exciting new avenue in infant curiosity research, with recent research associating theta band waves 
as curiosity’s potential biomarker (Begus, Gliga, and Southgate 2016; Köster, Langeloh, and Hoehl 
2019). Systematic and multi-faceted investigation into the cognitive correlates of curiosity is key 
to uncovering its mechanisms. 
In sum, curiosity drives knowledge acquisition, with its mechanisms actively enabled from 
the first months of an infant’s life and behavioural manifestations becoming more complex and 
sophisticated with the development of the child’s cognitive capacities and communicative 
repertoire. Curiosity leads to the pursuit of knowledge, either specific to answer a pertinent 
question, or broad, to satisfy one’s drive for exploring and generating information, and can manifest 
itself in various ways which are possible to capture using behavioural, physiological, and neural 
measures. What curiosity alone is not able to explain is the cognitive-affective state underlying the 
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need to know commonly referred to as wonder. The next section will cover the variety of theoretical 




Having reached the information-seeking goal of their curiosity-driven exploration, children may 
experience the state of wonder, understood as an emotionally laden, rewarding mental state of 
pondering upon their discoveries with astonishment and excitement about embarking on further 
deeper enquiry into the phenomenon. While ‘burning with curiosity’ made Alice follow the white 
rabbit in the first place, as her adventures unfold, she finds them ‘curiouser and curiouser’.2 In 
addressing how curiosity and wonder differ from each other, we emphasize affective response, 
reflection on obtained information, and seeking deeper and broader knowledge. 
Scholars in philosophy and education disciplines have long debated about the nature of 
wonder (Schinkel 2020; Gallagher et al. 2015). Wonder has been defined as an astonishing, 
incomprehensible surprise, transcending the existing structures (Fingerhut and Prinz 2018), a 
combination of cognitive perplexity and intense perceptual engagement (Weger and Wagemann 
2018), which is intricately linked to epistemic cognition. Two broad types of wonder have been 
proposed (Carlsen and Sandelands 2015; Parsons 1969; Schinkel 2017; Washington 2018): an 
active one (more akin to curiosity, ‘wondering about’) and the passive one, also called deep or 
contemplative wonder (more akin to awe, ‘wondering at’), which “involves not knowing of a 
different kind – not a not-yet-knowing, but a fundamental, irresolvable not-knowing” (Schinkel 
2017, 546). In this way, curiosity is a quest for knowledge that is already out there, while wonder 
is a quest for knowledge that may never be attainable. It is this propensity for posing essentially 
rhetorical, ‘big questions’, that may have led Socrates to famously propose that wisdom begins in 
wonder. Unlike curiosity, wonder can never be satisfied fully; it is not terminal as it would not 
disappear once relevant or missing information about the phenomenon has been discovered 
(Sinclair and Watson 2001). These conceptual distinctions date back to the Ancient Greek 
dichotomy: wonder is viewed as essentially a quest for truth, achieved by embracing holistic 
perception and remaining open to uncertainty, a valuable experience in itself regardless of the 
logical outcomes (Plato), while curiosity is a quest for information in order to fill epistemic gaps, 
reduce uncertainty, and deconstruct the phenomenon into parts in a rational, optimal way 
(Aristotle) (Schinkel 2017; Vasalou 2015). Centuries later, at the dawn of the cognitive revolution 
in psychological science, Bruner (1961) described a similar dichotomy in more contemporary 
terms: a “learning as a task of discovering” (curiosity) in comparison to “learning about” as a 
sought-after disposition which facilitates a deeper quest, accompanied by a sense of agency and 
mastery orientation (wonder).   
While the contemporary field of education has been actively emphasizing the benefits of 
wonder for learning (Booker and Batt 2016; Jacobs and Crowley 2007; Edeiken 1992; Egan 2014; 
Opdal 2001) and the philosophical scholarship investigating wonder is thriving, the cognitive 
developmental research on this mental state is in its infancy. Below we review major advances in 
conceptualizing wonder – from an epistemic emotions view and a developmental perspective – and 
discuss the differences between wonder and related concepts such as curiosity and awe in light of 
these approaches. 
Curiosity and similar states such as interest, surprise, wonder, astonishment, awe, doubt, 
uncertainty, boredom, feeling of knowing, fear of the unknown, to name a few, have been 
 
2 A set of cliché quotes from Alice in Wonderland is a must in a conversation about curiosity, wonder and creativity. 
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collectively referred to as ‘epistemic emotions’ (Carruthers 2017; Scheffler 1991; Vogl et al. 2019). 
According to these theories, affective and cognitive processes work in tandem, with epistemic 
emotions enriching purely cognitive activities related to the pursuit of knowledge and learning, 
such as information-seeking, explanation-seeking, belief formation and revision (Frijda, Manstead, 
and Bem 2000; Izard 1992). While other emotions, such as happiness, anger, or hatred may also 
affect epistemic processes under certain conditions, what makes epistemic emotions unique is their 
specialization in characterizing (either supporting or inhibiting) epistemic goals. Despite 
substantial advances in identifying a range of affective mental states that influence processes 
related to knowledge acquisition and revision, the nature of the relationships between some of the 
core emotions has not yet been clearly delineated. For instance, wonder has been included in 
composite measures of awe (Saroglou, Buxant, and Tilquin 2008; Shiota, Keltner, and Mossman 
2007) but often used interchangeably with curiosity (e.g., “I am curious/wonder about”; Bijou 
1998; Valdesolo, Shtulman, and Baron 2017) and surprise as a response to the unexpected (Frijda 
1986). The causal links between concepts are also debated: according to one view, curiosity may 
arise from the feelings of awe or wonder and motivate exploration in order to resolve uncertainty 
(Frijda 1986; Izard 1977); on another view, wonder arises when curiosity-driven pursuits reach 
their limits (upon obtaining all pertinent information), by making one probe deeper (Opdal 2001). 
Despite these differences, both curiosity and wonder are agreed to be intrinsically rewarding 
emotional states promoting learning in the form of active explorative activities and constructive 
knowledge acquisition.  
A classical theory providing a valuable insight into the distinction between curiosity and 
wonder is the Piagetian theory of cognition (Piaget 1969), proposing that at first novel information 
is processed in order to be incorporated into the existing knowledge base through a process called 
assimilation. If successful, new information forms part of the ever-expanding knowledge repository 
in the mind. However, if the assimilation process fails, people either abandon the attempts to learn, 
or this novel information instead undergoes the process of accommodation – creating new 
knowledge structures to adopt the incoming information. In other words, assimilation incorporates 
new information into preexisting epistemic schemas, while accommodation changes the 
preexisting schemas to absorb new information. This latter property of the accommodation process 
is what links it to wonder as a qualitative and quantitative expansion of curiosity-driven information 
acquisition.  
A combination of both the epistemic emotions view and the accommodation process of 
cognition lays a foundation for empirical study of the state of wonder and its cognitive origins. 
Schinkel (2018) urges psychologists (in addition to educators and philosophers) to dedicate more 
attention to wonder, especially as distinguished from curiosity and awe. We further propose that 
study of wonder would benefit from a cognitive development perspective, because understanding 
of early manifestations of any psychological phenomena may help explain complex cognitive 
mechanisms underlying these processes in adults. 
Despite a well-developed theoretical base, empirical developmental research on wonder is 
lacking. One argument limiting research on wonder from a cognitive developmental perspective is 
that as a complex, reflective state requiring sophisticated metacognitive abilities, wonder may not 
be readily accessible to young children. Studies of metacognition generally conclude that 
children’s ability to self-monitor their own affective and cognitive processing is not present until 
the preschool years (Sodian et al. 2012; Sobel and Letourneau 2018). Children’s use of verbs 
related to epistemic states, such as ‘know’, ‘guess’, and ‘remember’ starts at around the age of three 
(Johnson and Wellman 1980), and children’s explicit understanding of complex emotions not until 
the primary school years (Russell and Paris 1994). Counter to this view, rudimentary metacognitive 
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processes have been shown as accessible to children even before they mastered language (Gliga 
and Southgate 2016; Goupil and Kouider 2019). Various proxies for implicit measurement of 
infants’ awareness of their metacognitive states have been used, such as conceptualizing a state of 
epistemic uncertainty as a delay in making a choice or persistence in attempts to find reliable 
information. For example, preverbal infants, using social looks and pointing as communicative 
tools, are able to strategically request information from other people when they are aware of their 
ignorance; e.g., when they don’t know where the toy was hidden but know that their parents can 
provide this information (Goupil et al, 2016) or when they don’t know the label to a novel object 
but know who can provide it (Bazhydai et al, 2020). If we accept that wonder as a unique 
experiential state is indeed accessible to young children and even preverbal infants, just as curiosity 
or uncertainty which have been actively studied in this population, similar implicit measures can 
be employed to capture its cognitive origins. 
What does wonder look like? A child experiencing wonder may be the one whose eyes are 
sparkling with excitement and amazement, one that pauses to think about the encountered 
phenomenon, one that persists in discovering more about the object that elicited wonder, or one 
that is not satisfied with the available answers. As we cannot rely on asking children what they 
think or feel, the use of objective rather than self-report measures becomes instrumental. Wonder 
may manifest itself neurally, physiologically and behaviourally in several ways. For example, we 
may record and analyse the overt observable behaviour, such as the kinds of questions that children 
may ask in wonder, as differentiated from other similar cognitive-affective states such as curiosity 
or awe. Such fine-grained behavioural analyses would allow disentangling the very conceptual 
uniqueness of wonder. Similarly, we may attempt to uncover the neural underpinnings of wonder 
by using techniques such as EEG or NIRS, or physiological signatures such as heart rate or skin 
conductance response, which, when compared with findings on other related states may pinpoint 
the exact biomarkers of wonder. 
To develop such measures specifically, we need to adopt a working operational definition, 
for example one like this: an intense, emotionally uplifting experience whereby the person becomes 
aware of an expanded field of possibility for thought or action and engages in exploring this field 
(after Glăveanu 2017, 2). This definition is two-fold, invoking several specific measures as 
plausible candidates. For example, the intensity of an emotional state can be detected through 
implicit measures of physiological arousal (heart rate and skin conductance response), facial 
expressions via EMG or pupil dilation response. These measures may allow us to distinguish 
wonder as an intense, expansive experience following astonishing events (both external and 
internal) from curiosity as less emotional and more iterative, rational information acquisition. That 
is, a wonder response should extend beyond preferentially attending to, approaching and exploring 
the unexpected events (Sim and Xu 2017; Stahl and Feigenson 2017, 2019). 
The second aspect of wonder according to the adopted operational definition – awareness 
of expanded possibilities and their passionate exploration – can be assessed both quantitatively and 
qualitatively. Children’s desire for more knowledge may manifest itself in repeated searching for 
information, lack of satisfaction with immediately available evidence, seeking corroborative 
evidence, and returning to the topic that sparked their wonder even when all explanations have 
been received. Aimed at explanatory expansion upon witnessing anomalous or ambiguous facts, 
this ‘wondering about’ (Carlsen and Sandelands 2014) may prompt children to engage in the so-
called ‘passages of intellectual search’ (Tizard and Hughes 1984) – a persistent stream of questions 
and explanations offered by children themselves as they strive to arrive at the truth about the 
phenomena of interest, above and beyond the routine ‘why’ questions (Chouinard, Harris, and 
Moratsos 2007; Frazier, Gelman, and Wellman 2009; Legare 2012; Ronfard et al. 2018). This may 
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also manifest itself in the number of comments and emotional content in such remarks, connecting 
the topic of the wonder-inducing phenomenon to personal experiences, and posing rhetorical 
questions.3 In preverbal infants, wonder can be measured as information seeking (e.g., through 
pointing or approaching objects) following reliable and timely attainment of key missing 
information (e.g., a novel label or demonstration of a toy’s function). That is, upon satisfying the 
need for information through curiosity, wonder is likely to keep infants inquiring about the same 
object or event leaving them unsatisfied with the answers. The length of time dedicated to asking 
such questions and further exploration may serve as a proxy for the measure of wonder. 
While given a lot of attention in philosophy and education, wonder remains an undeveloped 
psychological concept with its position in relation to similar terms unclear. To the best of our 
knowledge, no empirical work in cognitive development has investigated wonder as such. This 
may be due to young children’s underdeveloped emotion and metacognitive skills and 
methodological challenges to detect the experience of wonder, which is among the “precious but 
elusive psychological states that are difficult to research experimentally” (Weger and Wagermann 
2018). The study of wonder conceived as an epistemic emotion and a cognitive accommodation 
process is a promising avenue for future research, in combination with a range of cutting edge 
approaches to study complex cognition in early childhood. 
To reiterate, wonder, and specifically its active, inquisitive type, just as curiosity, enables 
knowledge acquisition, but takes this process to a different level, a step forward towards knowledge 
transformation. In the range of ‘playful interactions’ with the environment (Piaget 1945), wonder 
underlies the desire to go further, deeper and broader than curiosity, the latter being transient and 
inherently terminal. In a quote brought up earlier in this chapter, Piaget (1969, 139) mentions that 
information acquisition allows the child to arrive at a state of mind that is both irreducible, in that 
the uncertainty has been resolved, but also ‘indefinitely extensible’. This added value property, 
though not called wonder by Piaget explicitly, may refer to probing the field of knowledge further, 
allowing for multiple perspectives as a pathway to creative knowledge transformation (see 





Sometimes I’ve believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast. 
 
“I see nobody on the road,” said Alice. 
“I only wish I had such eyes,” the King remarked in a fretful tone. 
“To be able to see Nobody! And at the distance too!  
Why, it’s as much as I can do to see real people, by this light!” 
 
Lewis Caroll, Alice in Wonderland 
 
From a cognitive perspective, creativity includes a set of mental processes (rather than a particular 
personality or genetic predisposition) which manifest themselves in overt behavioural choices, 
such as coming up with multiple ideas (divergent thinking), forming unusual associations 
 
3 As an educationally minded side note, the beneficial role of the adults engaged in such passages is that in addition to 
resolving misunderstandings and presenting counterinformation if needed, they help children clarify and extend their 
own ideas and explanations. By questioning their ideas, adults facilitate the development of children’s independent 
reasoning and intellectual growth. 
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(associative thinking), combining elements based on such remote, non-obvious associations 
(combinatory thinking), and transforming the existing structures in original ways (transformative 
thinking) (Guilford 1968; Finke, Ward, and Smith 1992; Mednick 1962; Rhodes 1961; Simonton 
2010). Tolerance to ambiguity, flexible thinking, plasticity of mental structures, and openness to 
experience enable these processes. In contrast, functional fixedness, reliance on heuristics, context 
rigidity, hyper-precise prior probabilities as inability to update beliefs based on new incoming 
information, and general avoidance of new experiences are detrimental to creativity. Creativity 
thus can be conceptualized as a cognitive process leading to original modification of existing 
information and generation of new knowledge. We focus here on three core cognitive facets of 
creativity: idea generation or divergent thinking, novel combination, and original transformation. 
Creativity manifestations in early childhood are difficult to pinpoint. One difficulty is lack 
of developmentally appropriate measures applicable to the very young population. Even with 
adults, measures of creativity lack consistency and vary greatly with the conceptual approach 
chosen by the researchers (Baptiste 2019; Said-Metwaly, Van den Noortgate, and Kyndt 2017). A 
second challenge comes from adherence to the argument that children simply do not exhibit 
creativity in its true, eminent, genius-type sense (Feldhusen 2002; Weisberg 1999), also called the 
‘Big C’ (Kaufman and Beghetto 2009). This argument is dismissed by adopting a perspective of 
the so-called ‘little c’ creativity rooted in everyday playful imagination, undoubtedly accessible to 
young children (Amabile 2012; Bateson 1999; Craft 2001; Russ 2014). Accepting the premise that 
young children and even infants do not lack sufficient cognitive complexity to exhibit rudimentary 
creative behaviours (Glăveanu 2011; Engel 1993; Jalongo and Hirsch 2012), here we review how 
creativity manifests itself and how it can be measured in early childhood in order to better 
understand how these cognitive capacities develop.4 The literature on children’s creative process 
(as opposed to artistic outputs or other creative products; Rhodes 1961) is typically represented 
with several related but distinct strands: object play, imaginative play, and tool innovation. We 
review how the facets of idea generation, combination, and transformation are present in each of 
these strands and suggest ways to study these in young children. 
Just as children actively seek information in curiosity-driven exploration, they actively 
engage in creative expression and experimentation with objects. While exploration and play are 
often discussed interchangeably in child development literature (Power 1999; Wohlwill 2018), the 
two are distinct. It has been suggested that children’s play with objects is an early manifestation of 
creativity as only during play (but not exploration or other rational use of objects, such as 
construction) children create novel ways of using objects (Pellegrini and Hou 2011; Pellegrini 
2013). Pointing to their unique role in cognition, exploration and play have been differentially 
linked to physiological arousal levels (Hutt 1966): exploration correlated with elevated heart rate, 
while play with lower heart rate. During object play, children go beyond the systematic acquisition 
of information afforded by the object (e.g., learning that it rotates or plays music when a button is 
pressed, etc.) and using the object properly (e.g., using a block to build a tower), to inventing novel 
ways to use the object (e.g., using unrelated, random objects to build a tower). Hence, they exhibit 
freedom from constraints of what is known and find creative opportunities where none existed. 
Both infants’ and adults’ playfulness have been shown to serve as a precursor to later creative 
outcomes (Howard-Jones, Taylor, and Sutton 2002; Lieberman 2014; Sutton-Smith 1967), and an 
 
4 In the words of Vygotsky: “One of the most important questions of child psychology and pedagogy is the question 
about creativity in children, its development and its significance for the general development of the child.” (Vygotsky 
1930/1967, cited in Smolucha 1992, 51). 
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evolutionary perspective highlighted the role of object play in cultural innovation (Riede et al. 
2018). 
Developing as early as eighteen months (Skolnick and Bloom 2006), a more cognitively 
complex process – pretend or imaginary play – has also been conceptualized as a manifestation of 
creative processes (Russ and Fiorelli 2010; Russ and Wallace 2013; Vygotsky 1967, 2004; 
Weisberg 2014). Imaginary play, similar to object play, is inventing novel ways of using an object, 
but here, it involves substitutions of functions of objects and creating new meaning (e.g., pretend 
that it can fly). During imaginative play, the child demonstrates remarkable tolerance to 
uncertainty, “not bothered by inconsistencies, departures from convention, nonliteralness (...) 
which often results in unusual and appealing juxtapositions and associations” (Gardner 1993, 228). 
This openness to new experiences and actively creating such experiences is possible due to a 
heightened alertness to opportunity – ability to notice relevance of available information (objects, 
people, situations) for potentially including it into the pretend play space. Inspired by this child-
like capacity, Torrance (1988) trained adults who have performed poorly on standard creativity 
tasks to appreciate a cue-rich environment and take advantage of unrelated objects and concepts 
for creative recombination and transformation. 
Another way in which creativity manifests itself in early childhood is through spontaneous 
tool innovation (Beck et al. 2011; Carr, Kendal, and Flynn 2015; Cutting et al. 2014). Innovation 
along with imitation are considered the “dual engines of cultural learning” (Legare 2015), playing 
complementary roles in knowledge acquisition and transmission (Carr, Kendal, and Flynn 2016; 
Heyes 2012; Want and Harris 2002). Unlike imitation following a social demonstration, children’s 
tool innovation in experimental tasks has been rarely observed (Chappell et al. 2013). This is 
typically explained by their propensity to learn socially and to conform in their tool use after 
observing someone else (Flynn, Turner, and Giraldeau 2018; Turner, Giraldeau, Flynn 2017), 
especially someone with a history of efficacious and reliable demonstrations (Carr, Kendal, and 
Flynn 2015). However, recent research suggests that children are more likely to use a tool in a 
novel way when its original purpose became clear rather than when it remained causally opaque 
(Neldner, Mushin, and Nielsen 2017) and when the efficacy of the adults’ demonstration was low, 
leaving space for further experimentation (Carr, Kendal, and Flynn 2015). Furthermore, research 
with adults shows that other people’s social performance cues may influence innovative choices 
(Toelch et al. 2011). In this vein, infants as young as 30 months of age have been shown to be able 
to achieve tool innovations when socially guided to do so, but not when left on their own (Hayne, 
Herbert, and Simcock 2003; Barr and Wyss 2008). Overall, the infrequency in reporting 
innovations in experimental studies may be the result of methodological shortcomings, where such 
behaviours may be discarded as anomalous findings rather than properly pursued (Carr, Kendal, 
and Flynn 2016). Despite these challenges, two kinds of spontaneous innovative behaviours in 
childhood have been identified: independent invention (such as creating a novel tool from scratch) 
and modification (such as adopting an existing tool for a new purpose) (Carr, Kendal, and Flynn 
2016).  
One of the core pillars of the creativity process is idea generation, or divergent thinking – 
an ability to come up with multiple ideas, alternative scenarios, thoughts and actions. In adults and 
older children, divergent thinking is tested using a variation of the classical Unusual Uses task 
(Torrance and Haensly 2003; Mouchiroud and Lubart 2001). Here, a person typically is asked to 
list as many uses for an everyday object, e.g. a paperclip, as they can (e.g., Alternative Uses Test: 
Guilford 1967; Torrance Test of Creative Thinking [TTCT]: Torrance 1974; Thinking Creatively 
in Action and Movement test [TCAM]: Torrance 1981; Wallach and Kogan tests of creativity: 
Wallach and Kogan 1965). The number and breadth of unusual uses are then scored to assess the 
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level of creativity. Divergent thinking has been assessed in the verbal (report on various ideas), 
figural (drawing), kinaesthetic (movement) and manual (object use) domains. The latter is most 
useful from a cognitive developmental perspective since young children may not have yet 
developed language or drawing ability. In a recent demonstration of the applicability of the 
divergent thinking measure in preverbal infants, Hoicka and colleagues (Bijvoet-van den Berg and 
Hoicka 2014) used a colourful wooden box with several exciting features and five unrelated 
objects. Here, divergent thinking was coded as the number of different action-box area 
combinations infants applied during a free play episode (e.g., hitting the edge of the box and then 
guiding an object through the hole). Evidence also suggests that young children increase their 
action innovations following social modelling of divergent thinking behaviours by adults (Hoicka 
et al. 2016). While divergent thinking received the most attention in both adults’ and children’s 
creativity measures, it has been pointed out that over-reliance on this one measure is 
inappropriately reductionist as it misrepresents the dynamic, complex nature of creativity processes 
(Baptiste 2019; Baer 2016). 
The second facet of creative cognition is the ability to come up with novel combinations. 
Here, unlike in divergent thinking where novel ideas depart from the known, the process is building 
heavily on the elements of existing knowledge, which are then combined in a novel way. At the 
core of this process lies the ability to re-imagine the existing structures – also called creative 
problem-finding (Runco 1994). In a seminal study with adult artists, Csikszentmihalyi and Getzels 
(1971) presented participants with a range of objects to use in a still-life drawing. The longer the 
artists spent choosing the objects, manipulating and rearranging them in several potential 
combinations, and the more objects they picked up, feeling their weights and textures and trying to 
work out their mechanical parts – in other words, time spent ‘finding’ a creative problem – the 
higher were their creativity scores received on the final drawings. Combinatory properties of 
creativity lie at the core of several major cognitive-based approaches, implicating the role of 
associative thinking, insight, mental imagery, conceptual combination, expansion and synthesis 
(Finke, Ward, and Smith 1992; Helie and Sun 2010; Mednick 1962; Simonton 2010; Thagart and 
Steward 2011). For example, in a creative synthesis task (Finke 1990), adults are tested on their 
ability to construct creative objects by mentally combining the components they are presented with 
into a potentially useful entity. The process of insight is understood here as an underlying cognitive 
restructuring of the problem that allows coming up with a sudden solution (Bowden et al. 2005; 
Gilhooly and Murphy 2005; Schooler and Melcher 1995). 
The third core facet of creativity is the ability to make original transformations. Like with 
combinations, this process relies on some existing knowledge as a baseline structure, which is then 
modified in a novel way. For example, in a classical creativity task used with adults and children 
(TTCT; Torrance 1974), participants are asked to transform an incomplete figure by coming up 
with additional elements to complete the drawing. Similarly, the symbolical equivalence test 
(Barron 1988) measures the ability to make original transformations of objects or concepts, such 
as thinking of relevant metaphors or symbols. Such image transformation ability has been shown 
to correlate with performance on other creativity tasks in adults and predicted originality of their 
inventions (Palmiero et al. 2015). For young children, the process of pretend play serves as an 
excellent illustration, as children use existing objects but transform their meanings such that they 
depart from routine use (Russ 2013), transforming their imagination into reality (Vygotsky 2004). 
Thus, the ability to transform presents a viable line of research with young children.  
How can divergent thinking, combinatory and transformative creative processes be 
measured in young children, keeping aside tasks that rely heavily on language or ability to draw or 
make other forms of art? Observational and behavioural experimental studies come to the forefront 
13 
 
here, accompanied with fine-grained coding. Children may be observed while playing with a novel 
toy affording multiple actions and outcomes, just like the unusual box task (Bijvoet-van den Berg 
and Hoicka 2014). Measuring the number of unique actions performed is a clear proxy for divergent 
thinking, while the sequences of actions and specific action combinations can be coded as a proxy 
for combinatorial thinking. Here, the behaviour of interest is deviation from the typical use when 
two or more of such uses are combined. Transformation can be observed when children put together 
two unrelated objects in the process of play to create new meaning. A similar observation can be 
made when children engage with other elements which can be potentially combined or transformed, 
aside from toys or play objects. An example is providing children with a musical instrument like a 
piano or a xylophone, or a ‘music wall’ or ‘music stairs’ – an interactive sound sculpture of various 
shapes and colours – affording a range of musical keys. Creating novel musical sounds by 
combining them, transforming the sound of a single ‘press’ by adding other elements such as 
tapping or singing to them can be reliably coded by independent observers. Museums have long 
recognised the value of exhibits encouraging children’s creativity and it is time that cognitive 
science learns from them (e.g., Association of Children’s Museums 2015; Herz 2017; Luke et al. 
2017). A variation of such tasks may capitalize on children’s propensity to engage with mundane, 
everyday objects in an original way. A sample task to measure this process would be to offer them 
plain objects, such as wooden blocks or shipping cardboard boxes, and prompt their free play with 
them, subsequently coding how long and in what way they engage in the process, or even coding 
fluency, flexibility and originality of generated actions using the standard Consensual Assessment 
Technique (Amabile 1982).  
Implicit neural measures of the creative process are also possible with children with 
techniques such as fNIRS and EEG. Studies with adults have long implicated the brain’s default 
mode network (Beaty et al. 2014; Immordino-Yang, Christodoulou, and Singh 2012), dynamic 
interactions between the large-scale brain networks (Beaty, Seli and Schacter 2019), and alpha and 
theta oscillations activity (Fink and Benedek 2014; Stevens and Zabelina 2019) as correlates of 
creative thinking. EEG has long been a staple neuroscience method for studying various aspects of 
infant cognition (Saby and Marshall 2012), and advances in fNIRS have brought it to the forefront 
of cognitive developmental scientists in recent years (Wilcox and Biondi 2015). Proving the utility 
of this method for studies of infants’ developing default mode network as a signature of creative 
processes, a study using the fNIRS brain scanning technique was successful in capturing the default 
mode network activity in 18-month-olds (Bulgarelli et al. 2019). In sum, a combination of novel 
behavioural tasks and neural correlates capturing the facets of creative thinking in young children 
is necessary to move the cognitive developmental science of creativity forward. 
Creativity as a cognitive process involves forming unusual associations, coming up with 
unconventional ideas, and making use of available resources and context in an original way. These 
novel ideas are possible due to a flexible attentional system, shifting perspective, noticing elements 
that were initially unnoticeable, and perceiving remote affordances in everyday objects and 
situations. Three core facets of creativity – divergent, combinatory and transformative thinking – 
are exhibited in children’s object play, pretense and tool innovation activities, which form the base 
for experimental study of creativity process in childhood. 
 
 
What is the relationship between curiosity, wonder and creativity? 
We proposed that curiosity, wonder and creativity are complementary processes in cognitive 
development: curiosity drives exploration of the environment to gain new knowledge, wonder 
pushes the boundaries of acquired knowledge, and creativity enables active manipulation of the 
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environment to generate new knowledge and encourage new opportunities for learning. How 
exactly are these processes related to each other? 
Studies with adults have shown that curiosity, both specific and diversive (per Berlyne’s 
typology, 1954), predicts creative problem solving and performance (Hagtvedt et al. 2019; Hardy, 
Ness, and Mecca 2017; Harrison 2016). Here, idea generation as a staple of the creativity process 
is fueled by either diversive thinking, desire for novelty such as a brainstorming session (Voss and 
Keller 1983), or the cognitive process of iterative, step-by-step idea linking (Hagtvedt et al., 2019). 
Curiosity and wonder as an intrinsic need for knowledge are proposed to be the means for reaching 
creative goals (Kashdan and Fincham 2002; Taylor 1964). On another account, an expansive state 
of wonder (the kind most similar to awe) affects creative thinking through modification of 
preexisting mental frames and openness to alternative perspectives (Chirico et al. 2018). However, 
the existing research is both limited, due to an overwhelming reliance on self-report measures (e.g., 
essentially asking adult participants: “Are you a curious/wondrous/creative person?” which is very 
prone to social desirability biases), and inconclusive, as it often does not take into account 
personality traits such as openness to experience, which is equally predictive of curiosity, wonder 
and creativity (Hunter et al. 2016; Silvia et al. 2015). Furthermore, curiosity conceptualized as a 
stable trait has been shown to form part of one’s creative self-efficacy and creative personal identity 
(Karwowski 2012), thus reducing curiosity to an aspect of creativity and generally blending the 
distinctions between these concepts (Arasteh 1968; Maw and Maw 1965; Penney and McCann 
1964). Nevertheless, research with adults firmly intertwined curiosity, wonder and creativity, 
although the causal direction and the nature of these links remain to be better understood. Several 
theoretical approaches are plausible. 
One line of thinking proposes a linear relationship, in that curiosity and wonder are direct 
precursors to creativity: the generative power of curiosity may lead to a state of wonder, which 
may in turn lead to creative pursuits. In more detail, exploration of the environment leads to 
accumulation and integration of multiple experiences and perspectives through assimilation and 
accommodation of existing information. Creativity then follows as modification and 
transformation of this information in order to generate new knowledge. The traces of this idea are 
present in early cognitive developmental literature. Vygotsky (Ayman‐Nolley 1992; Lindqvist 
2003; Vygotsky 2004) proposed that accrual of experiences and a combinatorial process applied to 
what is known are the building blocks of creative thought.5  Similarly, the Piagetian account of 
knowledge construction through playful interactions with the environment (Piaget 1945; 1969) 
posits the accumulation and accommodation of multiple scenarios and perspectives as a pathway 
to creativity. Hence, the richness of experience, both quantitatively and qualitatively, ultimately 
affects the richness of creative imagination.  
The following two theoretical models specifically link wonder and creativity in this way 
and are ripe for empirical investigation. Glăveanu (2017) argues that a wondering person is able to 
entertain and adopt multiple perspectives, to engage with the possible and the impossible in novel 
ways, and to inhibit conventional schemas. Having opened up the possibility for multiple 
perspectives, a person can then explore those perspectives through creation. A pillar of creativity 
– divergent thinking – is rooted in engagement with the expanded space of the possible. Schinkel 
(2017) similarly suggests that wonder’s openness to experience, eagerness to inquire, desire to 
understand, and willingness to suspend judgement and bracket existing – potentially limiting – 
 
5 “…the creative activity of the imagination depends directly on the richness and variety of a person’s previous 
experience because this experience provides the material from which the products of fantasy are constructed.” 
(Vygotsky 2004, 9). 
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ways of thinking, seeing, and categorizing, paves the way for creativity. On the one hand, wonder 
pushes the boundaries of what is known to the realm of the still mysterious phenomena; on the 
other hand, “wonder defamiliarizes the familiar, making it appear in a new light, as if seen for the 
first time” (Schinkel 2017, 543). Regardless of how familiar or novel the object of wonder is, it is 
the active act of wondering that makes subsequent divergent thinking possible. 
Non-linear relationships between curiosity, wonder and creativity are also possible. First, 
the process may flow in the opposite direction depending on the stage: engaging in a creative act 
(e.g., playing a musical instrument) or witnessing it (e.g., attending a symphony concert) may put 
one in a state of wonder, and further prompt to search for specific information (e.g., what is the 
history of this symphony), which may in turn lead to more wonder (e.g., learning about a baffling 
fact), fueling another phase of creativity (e.g., writing a poem inspired by the unexpected fact). 
Second, the three states may be deeply interlinked so that dissociating them into curiosity, wonder 
and creativity at any particular moment may not only be impossible but would also be detrimental 
to properly accounting for complex dynamically evolving cognitive phenomena (see dynamic 
systems approaches for a similar argument, e.g., Smith and Thelen 2003). Third, the three states 
may be cross-fertilizing. Presenting a cyclical approach to creative cognition (Finke, Ward, and 
Smith 1992), the Geneplore model (made of verbs generate and explore), presents curiosity (pre-
inventive exploration) and creativity (generation of pre-inventive structures) as a means to each 
other in a cognitive process. For example, in preparation for writing a book, a writer may gather 
information about the époque, traditions, and people in their story. This would be the curiosity or 
exploration stage. Upon obtaining this knowledge, rooted in already existing and now discovered 
information, they then transform the facts in an original way, eventually generating new 
knowledge. This would be the creativity or generation stage. Here, creativity follows curiosity, 
which in turn enables further transformations and modifications so that generative and exploratory 
phases work in tandem, enabling creative transformation both through conceptual change and 
focused decision making. 
In sum, both linear and non-linear relationship models between curiosity, wonder and 
creativity are open for experimental investigation. Studies with adult participants, primarily in 
personality and social psychology research, have obtained mixed findings (see Loewenstein 2014 
for a discussion; Voss and Keller 1983), which may reflect the lack of measurement validity, or 
alternatively, show that curiosity, wonder and creativity are not best measured as stable traits. The 
links between curiosity, wonder and creativity in childhood have been proposed but underspecified 
(Cecil et al. 1985), hence necessitating advancement in experimental research rooted in cognitive 
approaches in order to delineate their relationship and specify their developmental precursors. 
 
 
Conclusions and further directions 
 
“What is this?” he said at last.  
“This is a child!” Haigha replied eagerly, coming in front of Alice to introduce her (…). 
“We only found it today. It’s as large as life, and twice as natural!” 
“I always thought they were fabulous monsters!” said the Unicorn. “Is it alive?” 
“It can talk,” said Haigha solemnly. 
The Unicorn looked dreamily at Alice, and said “Talk, child.” 
 




The intellectual fascination empowering every study designed by a cognitive developmental 
psychologist comes from the inability of young children to talk: if only these “fabulous monsters” 
could tell us all that we want to know about their curiosity, wonder, and creativity! In this chapter, 
we focused on these three concepts, intrinsically linked to each other but often used and researched 
without due attention to fine differences and causal links between them. Having developed clear 
operational definitions, the field of cognitive development would be able to undertake empirical 
investigations into these phenomena, which will in turn enable a better understanding transferrable 
to other scholarly fields. 
We presented a range of theoretical models along with emerging evidence on how curiosity, 
wonder and creativity underlie knowledge acquisition and knowledge transformation in early 
childhood. Curiosity is an intrinsically motivated, deliberate form of information-seeking through 
independent exploration and active social learning. Wonder is conceptualized as an emotionally 
uplifting, expansive quest for more knowledge through questioning of existing frames. The 
transition from knowledge acquisition to its transformation begins with wonder, which expands the 
possibility space for knowledge beyond what already exists, motivating further discovery-oriented 
processes to search more broadly and inquire more meaningfully. Both curiosity and wonder seem 
to be useful prerequisites to creativity, understood as generation of novel ideas, original 
transformations and novel combinations of the existing structures. As both curiosity and wonder 
enable learning, knowledge acquisition as a goal in itself eventually extinguishes curiosity, while 
it does not detrimentally affect either wonder or creativity. Creativity allows to develop new 
knowledge regardless of what already exists or is potentially attainable. In a nutshell, curiosity is 
assimilation of information, intellectual activity in search of knowledge to achieve a reduction in 
uncertainty, whereas wonder pushes the door open to uncertainty, and creativity allows for 
modification and transformation of information and is only possible with a high threshold of 
tolerance to uncertainty. 
It is premature to infer the causal links between these concepts. Cognitive processes may 
change dynamically from seeking specific information and engaging in broad exploration, to 
pondering upon discoveries and posing original questions, to generating novel ideas and 
transforming existing structures. Unanswered questions abound. Future research may ask whether 
curiosity and wonder differentially affect learning or creativity outcomes, or whether individual 
differences in trait curiosity remain stable across development and are retained in adulthood. To 
test the proposed linear relationship between these concepts, it may be asked if curiosity and 
wonder necessarily precede creative thinking; does one need to have satisfied one’s curiosity about 
the topic before the creative process can start? While curiosity seeks out relevant, pertinent, and 
reliable information to satisfy its goal, what kind of information is suitable for wonder and 
creativity? While we know that curiosity subsides once the missing information has been obtained, 
wonder may be much more open-ended. What about creativity? Does one stop being creative upon 
believing to have found the most creative solution? Is it the abundance of cues and information or 
rather its scarcity that is conducive to creativity, given its reliance on perceiving non-obvious 
affordances in the environment? We hope to see future research engage with these and other 
fascinating questions. 
Furthermore, essential both for enabling optimal experimental investigations and effective 
educational interventions is an answer to the question whether curiosity, wonder or creativity can 
reliably be induced. Some suggestions to facilitate curiosity are to encourage question-asking and 
critical thinking, expose children to counter-intuitive evidence, pose follow-up questions to probe 
further interest, encourage sharing interest with others, and create informationally rich 
environments. Wonder can be supported through exposure to various fascinating phenomena, 
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dedicating time and space to experience and reflect upon them, access to a variety of information 
sources, promoting tolerance of uncertainty and complexity, and being open and welcoming to new 
experiences. Creativity thrives in judgement-free, playful environments, conducive to artistic and 
emotional expressivity, and benefits from the use of trainable cognitive skills such as divergent 
thinking, conceptual combination, associative thinking, and cognitive flexibility. A more 
fundamental question, however, is whether a generic approach fits every child (Parsons 1969). For 
instance, we may have assumed that seeing the northern lights for the first time is a likely generic 
candidate for inducing wonder and started to use this as an experimental induction in our study. 
But what about those children for whom encountering a challenging mathematical problem is most 
wondrous, while the wonders of nature leave them unaffected? We would be devastatingly wrong 
to conclude in our experiment that these children were unable to experience the state in principle 
or were less prone to wonder. Considering such inevitable individual differences, longitudinal 
methods may be most instrumental in detecting developmental change in the behavioural, neural 
and physiological manifestations of curiosity, wonder, and creativity. Finally, while in this article 
we chose to focus on the cognitive developmental approach to the study of curiosity, wonder and 
creativity, other fields of empirical inquiry, such as phenomenological research, embodied 
cognition, or psychoanalysis, among others, may also substantially contribute to our understanding 
of these phenomena. 
The abundance of practical guidelines for parents, educators and psychologists urges them 
to foster curiosity, nurture wonder, and encourage creativity in children, often lacking supporting 
empirical data for the proposed interventions. Such evidence could be generated with the use of 
age-appropriate, interdisciplinary measures providing insight into underlying cognitive processes, 
asking feasible research questions, and conducting longitudinal studies marking individual 
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